

DDR AND CHILD SOLDIER ISSUES

This monthly review, produced by IOM, provides a summary of news related to the implementation of the Peace Accord in Colombia, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes. Presented on the first two pages are a summary of statistics on former child soldiers and adults in the process of reintegration, with information provided by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN).



DISENGAGED CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

Reported cases of forced recruitment since 1999:

› Total: **7,604**

30 November

Total disengaged since 1999

› Since 1999: **6,593**


› This year: **182**

› This month: **23**

› Currently enrolled in program: **257**


Disengagement by department

This year




(of known locations)

Armed group




Since 1999





Sex




November 2018 (This month)



Ethnicity



Age



ADULTS IN REINTEGRATION PROCESS

Total currently active in reintegration process:

› **7,359**

Total entered into ARN reintegration route

› This month: **32**

› This year: **761**

› Since 1999: **60,275**

State of all participants

Since 1999

1,034 **2%** Not able to locate

5,447 **9%** Not yet part of program

7,156 **12%** In process


16,787 **28%** Formally removed

23,641 **39%** Successfully Completed


6,254 **10%** Deaths

Demobilization by Department (top 9)

This month




Armed group





Since 1999

November 2018 (This month)




Sex




Ethnicity



NO DATA



Type of demobilization




Current occupation



Unemployed



Employed in formal sector



Employed in informal sector



Economically inactive (for age, disability, etc)

* those who have died or who are without occupational registry are not included

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

First 100 days of Duque's presidency

Key issues include continued conflict, the Peace Accord, and anti-drugs policy; increases in displacement and confinement (up 21% compared with 2017), attacks and assassinations of social leaders (up 357% and 143% respectively), and violent deaths in conflict areas are cause for concern.¹ President Duque seems willing to work with low-ranking former FARC combatants, but has pressured the higher commands and repeat offenders.²

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS

FARC-EP

Congress agrees to add magistrates to Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)

The 14 additional magistrates will assume the cases of military and state agents in a compromise regarding the Centro Democrático proposal to create separate courts for these cases. The FARC was the only party to vote against the agreement,³ citing concerns with regards GOC commitments to victims and the Peace Accord.⁴

JEP continues hearing evidence for Case 001

During the initial hearings, 24 kidnapping victims and their families shared their experiences and expectations with regards reparations. The JEP is tasked with sentencing those responsible, but also aims to contribute to truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition.⁵ The military also delivered an initial report at the end of November, detailing 207,645 cases relating to kidnappings carried out by the FARC, with the most common effects being forced displacement, homicide, forced disappearance, and anti-personnel mines. The JEP's investigation will also draw on information presented by the Attorney General's Office, and civilian victims' testimonies.⁶

Lack of trust between FARC and GOC

President Duque confirmed that if Hernán Darío Velásquez (alias "El Paisa") does not present himself before the JEP, the suspension of the arrest warrant against him will be lifted. He made similar comments with regards to FARC second-in-command Iván Márquez, who recently confirmed his commitment to the peace process in a letter also signed by El Paisa, Romaña, and other FARC leaders.⁷ Nine FARC leaders, including Iván Márquez, El Paisa, and Romaña, later signed an open letter exposing the reasons for increased mistrust towards the State and calling for the resolution of Jesús Santrich's legal situation. The leaders, who have left reintegration spaces citing the lack of legal and security guarantees, also criticized the modifications made to the Peace Accord and called for the inclusion of third parties and intellectual authors in the JEP.⁸ Márquez also wrote to the UN Secretary General on 28 November, encouraging him to call on the GOC to fulfil its Peace Accord obligations.⁹

Peace Accord's second anniversary

Two years after it was signed, 66% of its 578 commitments have begun implementation, 22% of which have been completed. While the FARC successfully demobilized and disarmed, and progress has been made in the functioning of the transitional justice system,¹⁰ there have been significant delays in integrated rural reform and political participation.¹¹ Security is a continuing concern, as is the economic reincorporation of former combatants, and changes to the Peace Accord, which have been rejected by the FARC.¹²

ARN director defends reincorporation of FARC

Reasons given for delays in former combatants' productive projects include difficulties in opening bank accounts and the need for prior planning and support for the initiatives. The first 30 individual productive projects were approved on 22 November, and 135 more are being processed. However, of the 203 projects and 90 business initiatives studied in October, only 36 received resources, and of the 24 projects evaluated, only two received funding.¹³

Truth Commission begins implementation

For the next three years, the TC, one of three transitional justice mechanisms outlined by the Peace Accord, will operate in 10 "macroregions" and 26 municipalities, functioning through nine "Truth Houses" and mobile commissions to investigate the roots, patterns, and effects of violence across the country.¹⁴ The TC will not issue judgements or sentences,¹⁵ but rather seeks a collective, inclusive account of the armed conflict.¹⁶

PEACE PROCESS-ELN

INTERPOL issues Red Notices against ELN leaders

The guerrilla group's chief negotiator, Israel Ramírez Pineda (alias "Pablo Beltrán"), is now the only Central Command (COCE) leader without a Red Notice against him.¹⁷ President Duque called for these leaders to be delivered to authorities, and confirmed that military operations against them will continue unless they cease their criminal activities.¹⁸ Although the ELN released a hostage taken in Arauca on 28 March,¹⁹ they also attacked the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline in Norte de Santander on 12 November, bringing the total attacks on it to 78 this year, exceeding the 62 over 2017.²⁰

ELN names leader as member of negotiating team

Including Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias "Gabino," in the ELN negotiating team could be interpreted as an attempt to free him from the INTERPOL Red Notice against him.²¹ However, while a modified Public Order Law approved by Congress removes preconditions for beginning negotiations with illegal armed groups,²² and the Congress Peace Commission requested permission to meet with the ELN in Cuba,²³ the GOC has continued to demand that the ELN cease kidnappings and criminal activities before talks can resume, and has repeatedly called on other countries to implement the Red Notices.²⁴

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

UN Secretary General and EU Special Envoy joint statement

The statement, issued on the second anniversary of the signing of the Peace Accord, highlights the key successes over the past 24 months, including the reduction in violence, the beginning of the reincorporation process, the laying down and destruction of more than 9,000 weapons, and the transformation of the FARC into a political party. Both parties expressed their full support for the peace process with development, justice, and equality, whilst also recognizing the challenges already overcome, and on the horizon.²⁵

INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS

Action Plan (PAO) launched to protect social leaders

The PAO's founding decree outlines institutional and territorial articulation, and a communication and training strategy for the GOC's prevention efforts.²⁶ The *Observatorio de Violencia Política* reports 533 attacks between November 2016 and October 2018, with most targets belonging to victims or land restitution organizations, Community Action Boards, ethnic authorities, or movements against corruption or illegal economies. A pattern amongst perpetrators has proven difficult to define, as they often respond to territorial security dynamics.²⁷ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia expressed his concern over the situation of social leaders, declaring it "urgent and extremely worrying," and suggested that GOC responses have been insufficient.²⁸

DIVERSITY ISSUES

Security and Gender-Based Violence in Tumaco

As part of their series of publications on security for women and LGBTQI persons affected by the armed conflict, the *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* has published its Tumaco (Nariño) report after more than a year of research. Key findings suggest that territorial disputes between armed groups, and the presence of illegal economies tend to deepen GBV. The report also highlights that gender stereotypes and justifications for violence against women function as mechanisms for social and territorial control by armed groups; violence against women is underpinned by historical social vulnerabilities, and women would feel more secure if they enjoyed economic autonomy; security and militarization interventions do not make women feel more secure; women's perception of insecurity is related to the interruption of ancestral networks and knowledge; the lack of specific information on violence against LGBTQI persons makes protection measures difficult to implement; and prevalent prejudices and stigmas against LGBTQI persons contribute to continuing violence and discrimination.²⁹

FURTHER READING

The State in the Periphery: Local stories of institutional weakness

In this report, *Dejusticia* cites the continuing violent confrontations, mass displacements, and assassinations of social leaders as evidence that overcoming violence does not only depend on the implementation of the Peace Accord, but also on the strengthening of the State at the local level. A State which imposes itself without also building social support loses the capacity to impose itself; and a legitimate State which does not manage to implement order or overcome illegal organizations loses society's respect.³⁰